A New Page for Israel and Turkey

Photo: Haim Zach/GPO

Doğukan Atmaca

Lately, Israel and Turkey have been in high level diplomatic talks after the collapse of the East-Med gas pipeline project. After mutually sending warm messages, Israeli President Isaac Herzog hosted Turkish presidential spokesperson İbrahim Kalın in February, while Herzog paid a two-days visit to Turkey in March as a guest of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. It is also mentioned that Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu intends to visit Israel whereas Israeli prime minister Naftali Bennet will go to Ankara in May. Turkey also shows an interest in mutually appointing ambassadors to strengthen the ties between the two countries. All these recent developments point to a sharp turn in Ankara’s policy towards Israel since the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident when ten Turkish activists delivering humanitarian aid to Gazza were killed by the Israeli army, and again after the US moved its embassy from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018.

On the Turkish side, Erdoğan’s balancing act between Russia and the US-EU bloc has left Turkey more isolated than ever, and lately Ankara has been trying hard to improve relations with some countries in the region such as Armenia and Israel. Moreover, the Turkish economy has been severely shaken by Erdogan’s unorthodox monetary policies, and this situation is considered as a handicap for the upcoming elections next year. On the other hand, Israel needs allies, too, for its security. As a result, Israel has recently been moving towards establishing more cordial relations with Arab countries.

Both Turkey and Israel seem eager for to collaborate although Israel acts more cautiously towards Erdogan’s sharp turn diplomatic manoeuvres and states it openly. Herzog underlined that an honest and respectful relationship between the two countries would surely be appreciated. With this cautious remark, the president must be referring to the fact that there are still issues to solve between two countries such as Erdoğan’s support for Hamas and Israeli settlements in the Palestinian West Bank.

In fact, Turkey hosted some Hamas leaders such as Saleh al-Arouri in the past and other top leaders such as Ismail Haniyeh and Khalid Mashaal visited Erdoğan. Israel would expect Erdoğan not to provide a safe haven for Hamas anymore in Turkey in order to improve the bilateral relations. This could, indeed, be a concern for Hamas, and maybe a relocation to Beirut or Iran would be considered, according to Mokhaimer Abu Sa’ada, a political scientist at Al-Azhar University in Gaza. Abu Sa’ada also claims that Hamas could use Turkey for negotiations with Israel. However, it was Egypt’s president Abdelfattah Sisi who mediated the ceasefire talks between Hamas and Israel last year when two sides were in an extensive missiles battle. Although Naji Shouab, another academic at Al-Azhar University in Gaza, states that for Hamas Turkey is a better ally than Egypt, it seems that for now both Turkey and Hamas will choose to wait until the mist is cleared between Turkey and Israel.

Furthermore, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and European countries’ sanctions against Vladimir Putin’s Russia urged Europe to search for other gas and oil sources. While, east Mediterranean gas is close enough to Europe, de-stability and overlapping Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) claims between Turkey, Greece and de jure Republic of Cyprus (RoC) made the East Med project unfeasible. However, Turkey which is already a gas-oil hub in the region (by transferring Russian and Azerbaijani gas to Europe) offers the most feasible location and facilities for a gas line project. This could tie Israel and Turkey’s economic interests to each other. even though it is not possible for such a project supply Europe in the short run, in the long run the increasing energy prices and the will to push Russia out of Europe’s supplier list could attract more investors from European countries who would be willing to finance it. Any pipeline from Israeli shores to Turkey, however, must go through the EEZ claimed by the de facto Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which would be regarded as a recognition of the ‘breakaway regime’ in Northern Cyprus for the de jure RoC. Israel is not likely to officially recognize the TRNC which is only recognized by Turkey. However, it is interesting to note that Herzog’s plane on its way back to Israel flew over the TRNC airspace which is not controlled by the RoC. Technically, that means that the pilot flying the Israeli president’s plane reported to the TRNC aviation authorities, and if this is the case then this could be interpreted as a good-will gesture to Turkey for collaborating over de facto TRNC airspace and EEZ. Such an action in the future would certainly damage Israel’s relations with RoC and Greece, who backs RoC in the region. However, using TRNC controlled EEZ with Turkey is the most feasible way to transfer Israeli gas to Europe. Israel has already been supplying its own domestic market and selling gas to Jordan, Israel’s neighbour in the east, would be less complicated. However, Europe’s need for energy and the European countries’ quest to find a replacement for the Russian gas is also a significant factor. That could carry the issue into EU approval, probably a passive approval, by ignoring the EEZ disputes for such a deal with Turkey and TRNC. Simply, if there is no market in the EU, then there is no need to invest in a Mediterranean pipeline project.

Despite their frozen diplomatic relations, Israel and Turkey have a $6bn worth trade relations which makes Turkey an important supplier for Israel and Israel an important market for Turkey. (Turkey’s 3 % export makes up 6.86% of Israel’s import) Now they also see a common interest in the energy market. Nevertheless, Israel does not seem to be easily forgetting Erdoğan’s close ties with Hamas, and even expelling Hamas leaders may not satisfy Israel fully. On the other hand, Erdoğan recently asked for Israeli president’s contribution for a peacefull Ramadan, the holy Muslim month, in the Temple Mounth which often becomes a stage for violance.

In sum, although the Turkish side wants to take steps quickly in order to improve the country’s worrying economic situation, the Israeli side acts in a more cautious manner. Despite being significant trade partners, the relationship between Turkey and Israel is delicate due to Palestinian issue. Therefore, not only Ankara but also the Israeli government need to be careful with their actions if they are willing to establish stronger ties in the East Mediterranean. Israeli attitude towards the Palestinians and Turkey’s attitude towards Hamas leaders appear as the first level of obstacles to establish a more concrete deal and pave a way for mutual trust between the two countries.