Can Putin Throw a Lifeline to Erdogan?

Dr. Doga Ozturk

With the next presidential elections less than a year away, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been taking steps to deepen Turkey’s ties with Russia and his autocratic leader Vladimir Putin as a way out of the political and economic impasse in which he finds himself. In doing so, Erdogan wishes to achieve two key objectives: diplomatic support in his efforts of rapprochement with Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and a much-needed boost to the Turkish economy in the shape of Russian investments in Turkey and a favorable agreement for the purchase of Russian gas. On the other side of the equation, it is possible that Putin may opt for indulging Erdogan’s wishes to a degree with the hopes of continuing to use the Turkish president in driving a wedge in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while also trying to use Turkey as a way to by-pass the Western sanctions imposed on Russian businesses after Russia had invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Nevertheless, as much as he would like to do it, threats of retaliation coming from the United States and the European Union would prove to be an effective deterrent that would prevent Erdogan from throwing in his lot fully with Putin’s Russia.

Turkey’s relationship with Russia seems to have entered a new phase with the Erdogan-Putin summit held in Sochi on 5 August 2022. According to the joint statement issued after the meeting, improving economic and financial ties between the two countries has been one of the main topics that the two leaders discussed. Russian RIA Novotsi press agency has reported, for instance, that Turkey had accepted to pay its gas purchases in Russian rubles, a boon for the Russian economy hit by Western sanctions. Erdogan and Putin have also agreed on further expanding cooperation in trade and energy. The results of this deepening economic ties are already evident with the Turkish exports to Russia having increased by 46 % between May and July 2022 compared to the same period in 2021. Meanwhile, the Russian nuclear energy company Rosatom has annulled its contract with the Turkish IC Iştaş for the construction of the Akkuyu nuclear energy plant in Turkey, signing a new agreement with an enterprise named TSM which is owned by three Russian companies. In effect, the new contract transfers the ownership of Akkuyu nuclear plant to Russia. Contrary to expectations, however, Erdogan did not voice a strong opposition against this move, which came only days before the Sochi meeting. In fact, the pro-government press in Turkey has tried to put a positive spin on the issue, reporting that Rosatom has sent $5 Billion to Turkey for the Akkuyu plant, with “[t]wo other similar dollar transfers” planned “in a matter of weeks.”

For Erdogan, who is facing a deep political and economic crisis in the run-up to the presidential elections scheduled for June 2023, moving towards establishing closer ties with Putin may be his last best chance of survival. One of the main benefits that Erdogan would expect to obtain from Putin would be a rapprochement with the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. Currently, Turkey hosts close to 4 million Syrian refugees, who are perceived to be a major problem by a majority of the Turkish electorate, including Erdogan’s own support base. When he announced his plans of a new military operation into northern Syria in May 2022, one of Erdogan’s goals was to establish a 30km safe zone in the region where part of the Syrian refugees in Turkey would gradually be relocated. Nevertheless, things did not go according to plan. The actors in the region, including the United States, Russia, and Iran, have repeatedly voiced their oppositions against any new Turkish military incursions into northern Syria, which ended up not taking place.

Returning from the Sochi summit, Erdogan has revealed to the Turkish journalists that Putin has asked him to solve any issues that Turkey may have with regards to northern Syria through establishing a dialogue with Bashar al-Assad. Two days later, on 9 August 2022, a pro-government Turkish daily has written about the possibility of a phone call between Erdogan and Assad, who did not have any direct relations since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011. This report, which has not been denied by the Turkish authorities, was followed by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu’s declarations on 12 August 2022 that he had had a meeting with his Syrian counterpart in October 2021. Seen through this light, it may be argued that with the military option out of the way, Erdogan is seeking a way to come to an agreement with Syria in order to send back at least part of the Syrian refugees currently residing in Turkey, which would ease his hand in the upcoming elections. In order to be able to achieve this goal, however, Erdogan needs Putin’s support. According to Ömer Önhon, Turkey’s ambassador to Syria between 2009 and 2012, Russia has been playing an active role in the negotiations between Turkey and Syria, underlining the reasons behind Erdogan’s need for maintaining and deepening his ties with Putin.

In addition to diplomatic support in coming to an agreement with Bashar al-Assad, another reason why Erdogan would want to establish deeper ties with Putin’s Russia is the possible economic relief that Putin may provide for Erdogan as the Turkish elections draw near. As is well known by now, Turkish economy is in a deep crisis, with the official inflation rate reaching 80 % in July 2022 and the Turkish lira continuing to depreciate against major world currencies. Relatedly, much like the rest of the world, Turkey faces an increase in the price of energy in the upcoming winter months, both for domestic consumption and industrial production, which is predicted to drive the cost of living even higher. It is important to note that Russia is one of the main suppliers of energy for Turkey. To counter the effect of the Western sanctions, Russia has decreased the price of its crude oil, which led to a doubling of Turkish imports in 2022. Hoping to continue this trend, Erdogan may ask to come a favorable agreement with Putin to purchase Russian oil and natural gas below the market prices, which would partially alleviate the effects of a possible energy crisis. Moreover, possible Russian investments in Turkey, especially through attracting the wealth of Russian oligarchs, who have been prevented from doing business in Western nations, may provide another economic boost for Erdogan in his bid for reelection in June 2023.

While Erdogan sees closer ties with Putin as a way to ensure his political survival, Putin perceives keeping Erdogan close as an effective way to destabilize the Western bloc and break out of his diplomatic isolation. Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the relationship between NATO and Turkey has been strained, mainly due to Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 missile systems in 2017. Moreover, although Turkey continues to sell Bayraktar drones to Ukraine, the Erdogan government conspicuously refused to join the Western countries in imposing sanctions on Russia. Erdogan has also blocked Sweden and Finland’s accession bids to NATO, a move that is vehemently opposed by the Russian president. Seen through this lens, it would not be too far-fetched to claim that Putin may be willing to indulge some of Erdogan’s short-term demands to keep the Turkish president in power. Using Erdogan’s anti-Western and authoritarian stance for his own advantage, Putin would continue to drive a wedge within the Western bloc that is gradually becoming more unified against him.

There is, however, one major obstacle that prevents Erdogan from going all the way in siding with Putin: the threat of Western sanctions. Recently there has been reports in the Western press outlets that American and European authorities were becoming increasingly uneasy about Erdogan’s deepening ties with Putin’s Russia. According to an article that appeared on Financial Times on 7 August 2022, two days after the Sochi summit, western officials expressed that they were “concerned about the pledge made by Turkish and Russian leaders to expand co-operation on trade and energy.” More importantly, the Western authorities are wary of the possibility that Turkey may help Russian businesses to by-pass the sanctions imposed upon them. In an unusual move, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Wally Adeyemo has sent a letter to the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD in Turkish), indicating that “Turkish companies were at risk of coming under U.S. sanctions if they did business with sanctioned Russian individuals.” According to the Turkish press, Turkish business took this warning seriously and were concerned about possible sanctions. With the economy already in tatters, it would be extremely risky for Erdogan to any Western sanctions against the Turkish financial institutions and side fully with Putin in his bid to get reelected in 2023.

Overall, then, it is possible to argue that in the balancing act he has been playing for some time, Erdogan may look favorably upon tilting more towards Putin’s Russia in his efforts to survive the upcoming presidential elections. In doing so, he would like to obtain Putin’s support in coming to an agreement with Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, while also hoping for economic help in the shape of favorable gas and oil prices as well as Russian investments in Turkey. Meanwhile, it would also be beneficial for Putin for Erdogan to remain in power since he believes that Erdogan may be useful as a destabilizing factor within the Western bloc. Threats of Western sanctions, however, would prevent Erdogan from deepening Turkey’s ties with Russia to the point that Turkish businesses and financial institutions would assist in helping Putin evade the Western sanctions.