Turkey’s Dilemma

Doğukan Atmaca

After the First World War, roughly the six hundred years old Ottoman Empire collapsed and it was replaced by nation states such as Turkey, Iraq, Kingdom of Hejaz, etc. The modern borders in the region are shaped by the foreigners, the French and the British according to their contemporary interests. However, since then, the region has not shown long term stability due to ethnic, politic, and resources disputes. In 1917, the Ottoman Turks also left today’s Israel and Palestine region to the British Empire. On November 2nd, the British government announced that they would support a Jewish statehood in Palestine. However, the Jewish state of Israel could only be achieved in 1948 after WWII. Modern Turkey, on the other hand, is not an empire anymore but a nostalgia based on its imperial and caliphate past for the old times finds an echo both in the country and abroad, especially among Muslim majority countries such Pakistan. Also, Turkey is the strongest military power in Eastern Mediterranean, and its power has been proved in the Nagorno-Karabakh and Libya wars recently. Turkey is also one of the military actors in Syria and does not hesitate showing its strength in its claimed exclusive economic zone (EEZ) which is disputed by Greece and the de jure Republic of Cyprus. Israel, on the other hand, is a country that could both ally and dispute with Turkey. Towards Israel, Turkey seems like having a dilemma between promoting its place in the Muslim world where an alliance with Israel would be regarded as a betrayal to Palestinians and updating its policies according to its regional benefits.

First of all, promoting Islamic brotherhood values significantly benefits for keeping Erdogan’s popularism up among Turkish voters. Also, Pakistan and Azerbaijan highlight their brotherhood with Turkey. Arms export to these countries, and especially Turkey’s Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) support during the war with Armenia strengthened the ties with the latter. Libyan foreign minister, Najla Al-Mangoush, stated that they will collaborate with Turkey to dismiss all the foreign troops from Libyan territories, this clearly excludes Turkish army from being an “outsider” hundred and ten years after their departure from the country. During the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Erdogan claimed a Muslim leadership in order to save Syrians from the “evil” Assad regime, and he would pray Friday prayer in the Ummayyad Mosque of Damascus as a triumph of victory. Therefore, Turkey supported rebel groups who would support Erdogan’s Islamic leadership, and later on Turkish troops stepped in Syrian soil to fight against Kurdish armed groups and ISIS. Currently, Turkey holds military posts in a roughly 40 km wide area from its borders to protect itself from refugee waves and prevent any Kurdish group armed and declare political initiative in the region. Erdogan has never been to Damascus as protector of Muslim nation, but Turkey managed protecting its interests in Syria up to some extent.

In Egypt, Turkey supported Mohammed Morsi who was backed by the Muslim Brotherhood which was banned for years under the previous president Hosni Mubarak. Then in 2013, Abdel-Fattah Sisi led coup dismissed Morsi, and Turkey cut relations with Sisi administered Egypt and supported the Muslim Brotherhood activities in Turkey. Recently, Erdogan’s Turkey and Sisi’s Egypt have been giving positive signs for a rapprochement. * An EEZ agreement between the two would benefit both sides, and it would strengthen Turkey’s hand in the region against Greece. However, the price for this is that Turkey pulls its support back from the Muslim Brotherhood, and probably give up some of its military influence in Libya neighbouring Egypt.

With Israel, on the other hand, relations can be more complicated in good and bad ways. In 2010, Turkey sent a human aid flotilla, Mavi Marmara, to Gaza, and Israeli Defence Forces attacked the unarmed ship in international waters and killed ten Turkish citizens. Turkey demanded an apology and compensation, but Israel insisted on not apologizing. Turkey recognizes such initiatives can cost high and may not reward well enough.

However, after the gas explorations in the region, Turkey began strengthening its ties with the sea neighbouring countries such as Israel and Egypt on collaboration. From the Turkish side, Turkey needs business partners or allies in the region to be influential, and not to be left alone. A regional alliance or trade partnership could approve Turkey’s power in the region not as a threat but as co-protector of stability. Explorations of regional gas reserves in the East Mediterranean has proved that mutual benefits can improve relations such as in the recent example of Turkey and Egypt. From the Israeli side, improving relations with the strongest military power of the Islamic world would decrease Israel’s security concerns, and could even change Israel’s impression in the Islamic world. Israel would benefit from partnering with Turkey in diplomacy and trade rather than having Turkey supporting Hamas. Also, together with Saudi Arabia which does not recognize Israel, Turkey is the closest G20 economy to Israel with its tourism, industry, and other economic opportunities. Indeed, Turkey ranked eighth for exports to Israel this year and the value of exports hit $495 million as the highest ever in March 2021.

This is the point Turkey’s dilemma is visible when its regional interests and security challenges Erdogan’s Islamic leadership policy which failed in Syria and Egypt, and Turkey had to step back from it in both cases. However, Turkey is still effective in Libya, but one may argue to what extent this is due to Turkey’s place in the Islamic world. Turkey’s caliphate and non-colonial past in the region offers sympathy among the people further beyond the region such as in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Indonesia, but it is arguable this past has the same effect in the Eastern Mediterranean that was used to be under Ottoman caliph-sultan’s rule until roughly hundred years ago. Nevertheless, Turkey could benefit from its long past in the region by emphasising a common past and win-win collaboration rather than promoting a leadership. A good diplomacy supported by economic and cultural partnerships could help Turkey’s position in the political arena. The same could also apply with Israel and Palestine which are constantly under mutual threat by each other. Turkey, at this point, could try to introduce itself with reasonable arguments after building non-negligible ties within long term-oriented diplomacy rather than promoting neo-Ottomanist caliphate nostalgia.